Keep writing: the critique of the university in Roberto Bolaño's 2666 by Eve, Martin Paul
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rtpr20
Download by: [193.61.20.65] Date: 12 January 2016, At: 09:32
Textual Practice
ISSN: 0950-236X (Print) 1470-1308 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rtpr20
Keep writing: the critique of the university in
Roberto Bolaño's 2666
Martin Paul Eve
To cite this article: Martin Paul Eve (2015): Keep writing: the critique of the university in
Roberto Bolaño's 2666 , Textual Practice, DOI: 10.1080/0950236X.2015.1084363
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0950236X.2015.1084363
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &
Francis.
Published online: 13 Oct 2015.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 26
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
Keep writing: the critique of the university in Roberto
Bolaño’s 2666
Martin Paul Eve
Department of English and Humanities, Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK
ABSTRACT
Roberto Bolaño’s 2666 is a novel that can be situated, aesthetically, within the
traditions of utopian ﬁction and the North American encyclopaedic,
postmodern novel. It is also, however, a text that is exemplary of a type of
didacticism that cloaks its mechanism behind an overloaded structure. One of
the explicit targets of this didacticism is the neo-liberal university that, in
2666, is structurally twinned with the police department and is thus complicit
in the novel’s femicides. This article suggests the ways in which Bolaño’s
novel attempts to discipline the academy while also outlining its mode of
crypto-didacticism. Taking theoretical cues from Theodor W. Adorno and
Pierre Bourdieu, this article reads 2666 as a metaﬁctional work that signals its
own desire to teach, thereby representing a fresh approach for ethics in the
postmodern novel and beyond.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 21 December 2013; Accepted 8 October 2014
KEYWORDS Roberto Bolaño; 2666; didacticism; university; neoliberalism
Introduction
There seems a duty incumbent upon those studying the ﬁeld of contemporary
ﬁction to acknowledge the problematic nature of national boundaries. Indeed,
many theoretical models have proposed that the nation state should no longer
remain the privileged entity for contemporary study, seen perhaps most pro-
minently in the work of Hardt and Negri. In an era of continued globalisation,
however, self-determination still seems to be locked within its paradoxical for-
mations as ﬁrmly as ever, even as discourses on the demise of nationalism
proliferate. Regardless of the degree to which one acknowledges the validity
and necessity of a transnational theoretical framework (sometimes schema-
tised as ‘TransLit’ in the recent terminology of literary studies), though,
language still remains an issue that ﬁrmly divides, even on the American con-
tinent. With the continued decline of comparative literature programmes, the
© 2016 The Author(s). Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Martin Paul Eve martin.eve@bbk.ac.uk
TEXTUAL PRACTICE, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0950236X.2015.1084363
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [1
93
.61
.20
.65
] a
t 0
9:3
2 1
2 J
an
ua
ry
 20
16
 
occidental academy remains focused upon English-language works and the
translation is left in a problematic space that seems still to grapple with the
dilemmas posed by Walter Benjamin in his 1923 ‘The Translator’s Task’. It
may be that these problems are intractable, but for meditations upon the
academy, its interrelation with neo-liberalism and the dangers of national lit-
eratures, alongside the problems of didacticism and the ‘bad translation’ of a
‘message’ one could do worse than to look, as will this piece, at Roberto
Bolaño’s astonishing novel, 2666, even if it is in translation.1
2666 has been heralded as phenomenal. Impossible to do justice here to its
size and scope, Bolaño’s novel interweaves ﬁve narratives concerning a set of
self-absorbed literary critics, the university professor Oscar Amalﬁtano, a
journalist called Oscar Fate, Bolaño’s ﬁctional reclusive author Archimbaldi
and a central section on ‘the crimes’, all spread across a 900-page epic.
These ‘crimes’ form the dystopian centrepiece with which the novel batters
its reader: the sequential, gruelling description of the bodies of the female
victims of sexual homicides around the ﬁctional town of Santa Teresa, a
thinly veiled rendition of the ongoing, horrendous reality in Ciudad Juárez.
In terms of its literary aesthetic, 2666 is at times an explicitly metatextual
work that situates itself within two traditions: the utopian work and the ency-
clopaedic novel, in the latter case particularly of the North American variety,
despite arguments to the contrary.2 This can be seen twofold in the text itself.
First, in response to its own representations of violence, the work overtly
queries utopian premises when it asks ‘why Thomas More [… ]?’3 Second,
Bolaño aims for his novel to be the ‘great, imperfect, torrential [work]’ that
struggles ‘against something, that something that terriﬁes us all, that some-
thing that [… ] spurs us on, amid blood and mortal wounds and stench,’
thus invoking debates about autonomous and committed art forms within a
vast structure; the link between aesthetics and politics.4
An aspect of this work that is worth considering, however, is the extent to
which Bolaño’s novel could fall under the remit of a category that I term
‘crypto-didacticism’, a phrase denoting ﬁctions that appear vast and chaotic
but that nonetheless aim to school their readership in ethics. In this light,
those in the academy given the task of ‘teaching post-millennial ﬁction’
should be aware that they might also read such a statement in its adjectival
form: post-millennial ﬁction that teaches. The broadest signal given by 2666
that it should be considered under such a mode, but also the key signal of
the target audience that the text seeks to educate, is that the university is
awarded a central place in the novel, which is certainly a dubious honour.
It is the contention of this article that 2666 is a text that trains its didactic
strains back upon the academy in a utopian mode that, while intensely critical,
still sees a limited potential for redemption. In other words, this article pro-
poses that 2666 is a novel that attempts to teach, and perhaps redeem, the
academy, a reading for which Sharae Deckard has already paved the way in
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her assertion that the ﬁrst two portions of the text can be deﬁned as ‘didactic
“set pieces”’.5
Linked to this pedagogical mission, it is also worth considering the aes-
thetics of 2666 within a tradition of what could be termed ‘ﬁctions of
process’, a brand of metaﬁction that asks the reader to value the journey,
rather than the arrival, the reading, rather than the having-read. As I will
go on to show and to explain, 2666 exhibits these characteristics (being com-
posed of several, anachronistic, practically autonomous sub-books and
without a clear arc of narrative progress) and can be seen as a novel that
instead seeks to effect change through subjectiﬁcation processes whereby
the aim is to encounter an anticipated reader who can then be hailed and
altered: an ‘experience book’ as Timothy O’Leary might term it.6 Such a con-
junction of process and subjectiﬁcation has an internalising pedagogical func-
tion in which the reader believes himself or herself to be an autodidact, even
though, in fact, the text presupposed its particular teachings in advance.
This article seeks, therefore, to twofold interrogate the didacticism of
Bolaño’s novel while also exposing the role that is assigned to the university
in this text, with particular emphasis upon its structural afﬁliation to the
police and their facilitation of mass murder. In short, fore-framing the
issues that will be discussed here in sociological terms for both the academy
and twenty-ﬁrst-century didactic ﬁction, as Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-
Claude Passeron put it: ‘[s]urely we need to question the underlying social
and political functions of a teaching relationship which so often fails, yet
has not provoked a revolt, and which is so often attacked, but only ritualisti-
cally or ideologically’.7
In order to effect this argument, this article will now be structured into two
distinct parts. The ﬁrst (‘Crypto-Didacticism, Utopia and 2666’) presents a
background to ideas of pedagogy and didacticism within the novel. It
begins by exploring the fact that interpretations of Bolaño’s text are frequently
premised on the same, perhaps reductive, ethical narrative, which begs the
question of why such a lengthy text is necessary if 2666 really is a novel
with a core ‘message’. Noting, however, that Bolaño takes explicit measures
to avoid conﬂating empathy and pornography (thus demonstrating a
nuanced approach to its depiction of horror), this section then moves to
examine both the political ‘commitment’ of the novel and the particular impli-
cations of the fact that Bolaño’s world is not its real-world correlative; the
impact of distancing seen in utopian ﬁctions.
The second part (‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Critiquing the critics and
the university in 2666’) examines Bolaño’s explicit representation of the uni-
versity in the novel. Noting that the university in 2666 is structurally twinned
with the police force and also that the text ridicules purely aesthetic interpret-
ations of the literature, I argue that Bolaño depicts the university as deploying
‘strategies of condescension’ in its ethical readings of the literature that sit in
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conﬂict with the academy’s own societal position. This leads to a double-bind
within the text calling almost for a silence of exegesis from the academy.
Finally, however, in conclusion, I note, through a reading of the conﬂicting
temporalities of the novel’s title, that Bolaño’s critique is not designed to
silence, but rather to raise reﬂexive awareness and to alter critical subjectivity;
there is a redemptive potential. In the novel’s ultimate demand that people
‘keep writing’, despite a ﬂawed subject position and despite the distance
from reality that is integral to writing, a more self-conscious conjunction of
pre-compromised ethics and aesthetics seems to emerge.
Crypto-didacticism, Utopia and 2666
As I will go on to show, 2666 is a novel that lends itself to a range of ethical
readings that, interestingly, all share a common narrative core. This is,
I contend, a result of the fact that Bolaño’s novel anticipates the reading
methods of the academy and plays a complex game of schooling in which
it attempts to foresee and guide the academic response, a mode that I term
‘crypto-didacticism’. At the risk of introducing another jargon-term into an
overly populated ﬁeld, but one that serves well to delineate a large strand of
ﬁction from the American postmodern literature to the present, ‘crypto-
didacticism’ denotes a subform of the encyclopaedic novel that hides an essen-
tial moralising purpose amid a lengthy, overloaded structure. The modus
operandi of a crypto-didactic novel is to cloak its purpose within a super-
dense structure so that, by the necessary intellectual capital that the reader
is forced to expend in comprehension, its fundamental normative ethical
propositions are all the harder for the reader to reject. This function is, to
slightly twist Adorno’s words on the inadequacy of the concept in Negative
Dialectics, at once ‘both striking and secret’.8 It is also, as Bourdieu might
note, an aspect that most readers of such hyper-dense works would wish to
deny. This seems to be bound to a false collective renunciation of the fact
that the cultural expertise necessary for the comprehension of such works
can also be seen as interchangeable with other forms of power and material
capital, derived from educational prestige: ‘fundamentally the work of
denial which is the source of social alchemy is, like magic, a collective
undertaking’.9
This aspect of Bolaño’s work can be seen by sketching a primitive and
crude generic history (or at least a conferring example) from the trail that
the author deliberately lays. Bolaño’s novel both overtly and implicitly
encourages comparisons to the works of Thomas Pynchon. Indeed, at the
content level, one of 2666’s central ﬁgures is a much-lauded reclusive novelist
(like Pynchon) while, formally, the trajectory of this didacticism can be traced
back to works such as Gravity’s Rainbow. To expand upon this, consider that,
although it has taken critics a long time to realise it, with some notable
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exceptions,10 the ethical core of Pynchon’s work can be easily summarised:
contemporary America’s power is predicated upon instruments of death,
developed by the Nazis, built by slave labour and exempliﬁed by the V-2
rocket.11 Of course, there is much else of interest in Pynchon’s and
Bolaño’s respective ﬁctions, ethics and aesthetics, but, at a reductive level, a
similar ethical formula can be deduced from 2666: four hundred women
have been tortured, raped and murdered, the police do nothing about it
because the victims are marginalised working class women and, to quote
Bolaño directly, ‘nobody noticed’.12 In other words, amid rampant ‘gynopho-
bia’ and omnipresent misogyny: ‘the women here aren’t worth shit’.13
A brief literature review of work upon 2666 reveals that these basic prop-
ositions are the foundation for the majority of critical writing on the novel’s
ethics, even when such readings are executed with speciﬁcally nuanced angles.
It is also clear that in drawing an ethical perspective from the novel, critics
usually posit a balancing act between an implicit ‘teaching’ function of such
literature and a critical skill in the perception, extraction and explication of
such teachings (a balance between an intent of the author and a poststructur-
alist aversion to such thinking). For instance, although very different from the
reading advanced here but also premised upon a fundamental ‘teaching’
within the text, Grant Farred has argued that Bolaño’s true focus in this
ethical setup is upon a critique of postcolonialism’s entanglement with neo-
liberalism (focusing upon the marginalisation of the labouring victims), a cri-
tique that, nonetheless, further strengthens the notion of a crypto-didactic
text.14 Likewise, Peter Boxall notes that ‘Bolaño’s ﬁctions contain a kind of
darkened image of a common world that is the closest the novel today can
approach to imagining democracy’, thereby situating 2666 within an ethical
framework of globalisation that teaches us of the ills that it darkly reﬂects.15
To put it concisely: readings of the ethics within complex, lengthy ﬁctions
such as 2666 tend, in the academy’s model of an ethical turn, towards a
speciﬁc didactic hermeneutic in which the novel is seen as a disciplinary
text that attempts to interpellate subjects within its own moral framework.
Indeed it could be, for these novels, as 2666’s Florita Almada puts it, that
‘teaching children might be the best job in the world, gently opening chil-
dren’s eyes, even the tiniest bit’.16
Like many other encyclopaedic, or even simply vast, ﬁctions, however,
Bolaño sets about opening his readers’ eyes through a structure of length
and overloading; to leap straightforwardly to the endpoint is to miss the
subject-forming aspect of these texts and would negate the internalisation
of such teachings. Hence, the didacticism is encoded in such a way that the
reader must invest intellectual energy, or capital, in the interpretation and
comprehension of the text in order to purchase the ethical payoff. Conversely,
however, Sharae Deckard has already noted how Bolaño adeptly connects his
intellectuals’ complicity with the contemporary environment to the historical
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situation of the Holocaust.17 In the structural obscurantism of this torrential,
imperfect work, 2666 also implicates the reader who misinterprets. In fact, the
mis-readings of the academy add a layer of fog that would only become com-
plicit with the Eichmann-esque ﬁgure, Sammer, who reminds his gravediggers
that ‘the idea isn’t to ﬁnd things, it’s to not ﬁnd them’.18 Even putting mis-
readings aside, this, of course, presents a problem for theoretical literary
research upon and readings of such work. To jump to the pre-formulated
end result degrades the utopic, critical power of such ﬁction. This is,
though, the same problem that explication creates in any form, for as Louis
Marin writes in his study of Utopics:
[t]he beneﬁts of pleasure the textual word play triggered were capitalized into
analyses and theses. An authoritative power settled at the very spot of what is
not capable of interpretation [… ] It may simply be impossible to write and
speak about utopia.19
Exegesis through criticism is thereby placed in its ﬁrst double-bind in Bolaño’s
novel: pedagogy against comprehension; utopia against misreading.
In this problem of explication against utopian (and pedagogical) function,
it is proﬁtable to consider the theoretical paradigms within which Bolaño’s
work can be situated. Although it is often thought within theoretico-literary
practice that new ﬁctions require new ways of reading, this may not straight-
forwardly be true, especially across such constructed bounds as ‘post-
millennial literature’; after all, this is based on a Christian calendar, a particu-
larly problematic construction given 2666’s ambivalent relation to theological
modes. What seems clear is that it is possible to identify certain emergent
trends of practice, some of which seem totally new and could require new
modes of reading, while others have a clear trajectory from well before the
century’s break.With this in mind, refraining from the nonetheless interesting
(and certainly more fashionable) approaches through Hardt, Negri or
Agamben that would undoubtedly yield interesting approaches, it is worth
examining the way that 2666 stages Theodor Adorno’s ideas of autonomous
and committed art while considering Bolaño’s last novel within two opposed
critical frameworks: as political and as utopian. These frameworks are useful
when thinking about didacticism but are nonetheless opposed because, in the
instance of political success, the critical utopian function of the artwork is
destroyed: as Marin puts it, this is when utopic practice comes ‘to the aware-
ness of its own process’ as ‘revolutionary “praxis”’.20 This consideration
should help to explain the crypto-didactic movement of the text because it
also exposes the way that the novel works through theoretical models of por-
nography and violence.
Adorno’s essay ‘Commitment’ presents a speciﬁc response to Sartre’s
notion of committed literature that is relevant to the discussion at hand.
Although Adorno is also highly critical of the term ‘commitment’ for its
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coercive mode of non-freedom in existentialist philosophy – a point he out-
lines in The Jargon of Authenticity21 – in the essay piece ‘Commitment’
Adorno posits two polarities of literature: committed art that has a speciﬁc
political aim, but that ‘strips the magic from a work of art that is content to
be a fetish’ and autonomous art, or ‘art for art’s sake’, that falsely denounces
its own ‘ineradicable connection with reality’.22 These positions, in which each
dialectically ‘negates itself with the other’, constitute the space in which all art,
Adorno claims, has lived; a space located somewhere between the utopian/
aesthetic and the political/mimetic.23 Interestingly for an analysis of 2666,
Adorno stresses that Brecht’s original intention, in which Adorno believes
he failed, was to practice an art that ‘both presents itself as didactic, and
claims aesthetic dispensation from responsibility for the accuracy of what it
teaches’.24 The ﬁrst problem for Brecht, as Adorno sees it, is that ‘the more
preoccupied [he] becomes with information, and the less he looks for
images, the more he misses the essence of capitalism which the parable is sup-
posed to present’.25 The second is that, in Brecht’s downgraded metaphors, in
this case the substitution of a ‘trivial gangster organization’ for ‘a conspiracy of
the wealthy and powerful’ in The Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui, ‘the true horror
of fascism is conjured away’.26 As Adorno puts it in this piece: ‘[f]or the sake
of political commitment, political reality is trivialized’ and in The Jargon of
Authenticity,‘“[c]ommitment” is the current word for the unreasonable
demand of discipline’.27
2666 is, in many ways, analogous. A work of epic theatre that nonetheless
‘has no epic pretensions’, the novel seeks to ‘make men think,’ in Adorno’s
phrase, but it does not rely upon a Brechtian verfremdungseffekt.28 Instead,
it cloaks any metaﬁctional estrangement in the mechanism of its action. It
is an overloading, not distancing, effect. Furthermore, Bolaño’s novel goes a
long way towards a negation of Adorno’s warning of committed literature’s
afﬁliation to pornography. This is not the more recent idea of ‘empathy
fatigue’ espoused in the wake of mass media culture, but rather that, for
Adorno, ‘[t]he so-called artistic representation of the sheer physical pain of
people [… ] contains, however remotely, the power to elicit enjoyment’.29
While Carolyn J. Dean points out, in her critique of this argument, that
this strain of thought has a heritage as far back as Diderot in the eighteenth
century, but substantially increased in usage around the 1960s in reference
to the Holocaust, Bolaño recognises this conﬂation of sexuality and power
that can occur in artistic representation and so constantly reminds the
reader that this pornographic mode is also one of sexual violence.30 Every
time the potential to forget the afﬁnity between the modes surfaces, the text
reminds us that many, if not all, of the victims piled up in 2666 have been
both vaginally and anally raped. Furthermore, in 2666’s discussion of snuff
ﬁlms, Bolaño gives the reader a strong metatextual clue as to where the
novel sits, reminding us of both the mimetic fallacy, but also the pornographic
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potential that, it seems, the novel wishes to avoid: ‘the snuff industry, in this
context, was just a symptom’.31 To rephrase this: Bolaño appreciates the ﬁne
line between empathy and pornography and metaﬁctionally signposts this so
that, each time the trap is open, the reader is pointed around the pitfall.
Bolaño, like Dean, wants to express ‘something quite a bit more complicated
than the conventional notion that pornography represents an unspeakable
association between sexuality and murder’, but is aware of this link and
warns the reader of their potential complicity.32
As a text that seeks, then, to ethically explore the power of ﬁction in the
wake of mass murder, it is worth considering how 2666 ﬁts within a
utopian tradition and also how it resonates with other twenty-ﬁrst-century
novels. It turns out this is in fact linked, in several ways, to the mode of didac-
ticism that the novel employs and the idea of ‘process’. In the study of literary
utopia, ﬁctions such as 2666 are usually not deemed important so much for
the speciﬁc topoi they present, although these are undoubtedly of enormous
real-world signiﬁcance and there is the ever-present danger of disserving
that suffering in critique and analysis, but rather for their more generalisable
qualities of dislocation and reformulation; a literary distancing from the real-
world analogies to which mimesis aspires. This idea of dislocation and refor-
mulation, a subjunctive thinking-otherwise, is, of course, a key concept in
utopian ﬁction. The notion of 2666 as a ﬁction of process also encroaches
on this realm, however, and can also be seen in other works of twenty-ﬁrst
century ﬁction. Consider, as an example, Haruki Murakami’s 1Q84 with its
abandonment of resolution. This work enacts a very different mode of inde-
terminate conclusion to Pynchon’s novels (which frequently end in the apoc-
alyptic sublime, or ironic nostalgia), or even to David Foster Wallace’s The
Broom of the System and Inﬁnite Jest, wherein the refusal to close the temporal
loop is itself a signifying practice. Murukami’s novel has no such pretensions
and, instead, 1Q84 presents a thrust at utopic dislocation through its twin-
mooned world, but in terms of narrative builds and builds until the repetition
causes a realisation that resolution is too late. It is utopian in the ‘no place’
homophonic preﬁx through the too late; the time that remains is too little.
This encoded, again crypto-didactic, metaﬁctive practice is a reﬁnement of
its crude precursor in Barth’s 1960s metaﬁction and points to the pedagogical
mode; rather than metaﬁctionally stating its utopian nature, the text shows
this, which may sound like a creative writing class cliché, but is probably
more akin to an inversion of Frank Ramsey’s statement on Wittgenstein:
perhaps rather than outright saying it, the text structurally whistles it.
This makes sense as an extrapolation from Marin’s formulation of literary
utopia. Indeed, Marin’s table of contents splits ﬁction into simulacrum and
signiﬁcation, a schema of codes and play that correspond to enunciation
and the enunciated expression, thus implying a dialogic structure. In short,
between practice and discourse, ﬁction sits as the ‘stage’, the utopian operation
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of process, of working towards, of travelling without arriving.332666 is a text
that deliberately signals itself in this mode. Its city is not the real-world
Ciudad Juárez but an emphatically insisted-upon intra-textual reality: ‘Santa
Teresa. I’m talking about Santa Teresa’.34 The potentially dangerous essential-
ism that is engendered by this dislocation and abstraction – the creation of a
‘ﬂoating signiﬁer’, as Sarah Pollack has put it35 – conversely lends itself to a
pedagogical function, at the expense of speciﬁcity; a ‘teachable moment’ as
the present lingo might perversely have it. Indeed, Bolaño even announces
that we should read 2666 in a critical dystopic mode through his mapping
of the city space. In this aspect of the text, Bolaño reworksMarin’s formulation
that the utopian city ‘gives not a possible route, or even a system of possible
routes, but articulations signaled by closed and open surface spaces’ in the
fact that his city is mapped by the female body, navigated by the male police
ofﬁcials, and mediated through the intersubjective shifts of narration in the
novel.36 To evoke Borges, as does Marin, and following Boxall’s reading:
2666 is a one-to-one map of the abstracted necropolis narrated with the
body-as-text, rather than a particular, speciﬁc space of lived horror. Yet, just
at the moment when Bolaño’s abstraction seems to go too far, the transna-
tional features of the text, with clear representations of global economy and
travel, return to lend a speciﬁcity to the location. Santa Teresa is also
Ciudad Juárez but in its ﬁctional abstraction, Bolaño is saved from the
purely political/mimetic and allowed to play with the utopian/aesthetic.
This questioning of societal independence in art, in conjunction with the
idea of the utopian tradition in 2666, prompts a return to Louis Marin and
his reading of May 1968. Bolaño clearly signals that the function of the uni-
versity, or rather its breakdown, is crucial to his investigation through the sati-
rical portrayal of the literature professors and the pretentious high-literary
writing of his ﬁctional author, with a cult academic following, who trails sen-
tences thus: ‘then, too, then, too, then, too’.37 As Farred puts it: ‘2666 satirizes
the cult status that the Archimboldians of all theoretical stripes have assigned
the elusive, Pynchonesque author’.38 Although it is worth noting the greater
menippean, or abstract, nature of this satire in opposition to, say, ‘An
Orison of Sonmi∼451’ in David Mitchell’s Cloud Atlas, which swipes speciﬁ-
cally at the Golden Arches of the capitalist diner, one of the key didactic pur-
poses of Bolaño’s novel is an attempt to critically evaluate the academy: the
neo-liberal university as a site of revolution, teaching and resistance. Examin-
ing these sites in his theoretical work, Marin asks: ‘[w]asn’t this the place
where the relationship between teacher and student, authorized and institu-
tionalized, could be deconstructed through this relationship’s very content?’.39
The University was proposed, in 1968’s grim optimism, as a ‘“properly”
utopic space,’ but how much we had to learn of utopia in order to see the
‘proof of the project’s failure’, writes Marin. Most are, by now, more aware
of the university’s social, as opposed to cultural, function than they might
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like. Indeed, it now seems barely conceivable to imagine an academy indepen-
dent from the dominant ideology, be that in its mirroring of the ‘capitalist
industrial system’ or of the labour practices ‘linked to the most insidious
forms of cultural exploitation’.40 Bolaño’s critique of the institutional struc-
ture is, however, more complicated than this straightforward, plaintive pro-
testing would suggest.
Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Critiquing the critics and the
university in 2666
As has already been mentioned, but will now be explored in more detail, the
dystopia of 2666 brings a speciﬁc focus to the structure of the university and
the text appears to mount several critiques of this institution. The entangle-
ment of the university in the dystopic critique of 2666 is furthered through
the statements that show, not a site of pure learning divorced from the hor-
rendous events that are charted throughout the novel, or even one on the
correct side of the failed revolution of 1968, but instead, an institution con-
nected by blood. In fact, the most transparent of these signposts is the
family bloodline: Don Pedro Negrete, head of the ineffectual and corrupt
city police in the text, is the ‘twin brother of the university rector’.41 The
scorn poured on the university here is not a simple case of an anti-academic
authorial jibe (although such institutions are also depicted as ‘breeding
grounds for the shameless’42), but an insinuation that the entire mechanism
of the university is twinned with the corruption of the police force that
permits mass rape and slaughter; twinned representations of Althusser’s
state apparatuses. Bolaño shows that the idea of the university as a site of
detached, utopian purity is deeply ﬂawed through an almost idealist mode
that separates appearance from essence. This is achieved through the fact
that the surface appearance, or depiction, of the critics in the ﬁrst part of
the novel is as eccentric and pedantic individuals obsessed with their texts,
merely isolated, but harmless. Their essence, however, is one of violence.
This is most clearly revealed when they savagely beat the taxi driver who
objects to their polyamorous interest in Liz Norton. At this point the text sud-
denly veers into discourses of national and religious hatred. Bolaño’s text is
instantly peppered with ‘English’ vs. ‘Pakistani’ and the violence is purported
to embody the insults:
shove Islam up your ass [… ] this one is for Salman Rushdie [… ] this one is for
the feminists of Paris [… ] this one is for the feminists of New York [… ] this
one is for the ghost of Valerie Solanas, you son of a bitch, and on and on, until he
was unconscious and bleeding from every oriﬁce in the head, except the eyes.43
The invocation of feminism as justiﬁcation for racial violence is particularly
pertinent not only to the femicides in Mexico, but also, of course, in a
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wider discussion regarding occidental neo-colonialism and Islamophobia. In
this instance, it is the university, through the critics, that appears central to
this violence.
As Bolaño gives no straight out-and-out reasoning for why the university
can be seen as totally complicit with this violence, it seems obvious to link it
with Grant Farred’s assertion of a critique of neo-liberalism and the academy’s
complicity in the paradoxes of exclusion within globalisation. This is seen in
the function of exclusivity and marginalisation in the university structure.
When the critics ﬁrst meet Amalﬁtano ‘the ﬁrst impression’ they had ‘was
mostly negative, in keeping with the mediocrity of the place’.44 The exception
to the group here is Liz Norton, an educated and intelligent character, but one
who is less tightly bound to the academic institution: ‘[a]ll they knew about
Liz Norton was that she taught German literature at a university in
London. And that, unlike them, she wasn’t a full professor’.45 Unlike the
other critics, Norton sees the human being rather than the competitive aca-
demic and the association of individuals with national placement: her
‘impression was of sad man whose life was ebbing slowly away’.46 Indeed,
though, ‘[w]hen Amalﬁtano told them he had translated The Endless Rose,’
one of the ﬁctional author, Archimbaldi’s, novels, ‘the critics’ opinion of
him changed’.47 The structures of value and worth that the academy co-
opts, in keeping with all neo-liberal, late-capitalist vocational careers, is one
of ‘excellence’ amid competition, but also one that privileges the preoccupa-
tions of the occidental university. When Amalﬁtano shares the interests of
the Anglo-American critics, his worth is increased. To distinguish oneself
from the mediocre mass is the aim, but the ‘mediocre’ mass, in 2666, are
being sequentially murdered.
The fundamental critique of the university’s entanglement with neo-liber-
alism is now well known and rehearsed, particularly in humanities depart-
ments. As far as the term ‘neo-liberal’ is useful to denote free-market-based
systems operated on a nominal insistence on transparency and underwritten
by ﬁxations on quantiﬁcation and measurement, this is well summarised by
Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades:
Public colleges and universities are exemplars of neoliberalism. As with neolib-
eral regimes worldwide, U.S. public higher education assigns markets central
social value. Public colleges and universities emphasize that they support cor-
porate competitiveness through their major role in the global, knowledge-
based economy. They stress their role in training advanced students for pro-
fessional positions close to the technoscience core of knowledge economies.48
Clearly, from such critiques, the direct threat to the liberal Enlightenment
humanist educational project through entanglement with the market is the
main objection. This prompts two responses that are pertinent to 2666. The
ﬁrst is a counter-objection that, as Stephen Billet puts it, ‘the provision of
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vocational education through universities has long existed, and has always
been largely directed towards occupational purposes, despite the contrary
often being claimed’.49 The fact that these vocations are well paid and in intel-
lectually demanding areas is often overlooked in the denunciation of the uni-
versity’s claimed secession to the needs of society. The second is that, if we are
to see the university and the police as twinned, as Bolaño’s novel implies, then
the function of the university that is under critique shifts slightly: the univer-
sity must work, as with late-Foucault’s reading of the police, to create a ‘live,
active, productive man’ but also to totalise and discipline.50
2666 presents, from this, an academy divided against itself. As revolution-
ary praxis, it is failure: there has only been a further entrenchment of the
academy in neo-liberal models of commodiﬁed education and societal disci-
pline. As utopian project, to follow Marin’s schema, the university also falls
down: the supposition of the university’s function as pure and discrete
from commerce or the aims of society leads to segregation and implicit com-
plicity through inaction with the exploitation (and in Bolaño’s text, murder)
of working-class women. This is clearly seen in the fact that the bumbling lit-
erature professors, alongside the rector who looked ‘as if every day he took
long meditative walks in the country’, form a group whose exegesis of
Archimbaldi’s texts as a ‘Dionysian vision of ultimate carnival’ sits in opposi-
tion to another group’s readings of ‘suffering’ and ‘civic duty’ in the writer’s
works.51 It is the eponymous critics’ anarchic aesthetic and formal approaches
that prevail in the text’s narrative and, in their isolated obsession with aes-
thetics, rather than an integration with the social, the suffering of individuals
is erased.
When viewed in this light, the role of the university as represented in 2666
brings Bolaño’s project back full-circle to notions of commitment and didacti-
cism. Indeed, the text begins to signal the acceptable interpretations through
which it can be read by university professors and the degree to which their
position is pre-compromised. In other words, 2666 demonstrates a reﬂexive
knowledge of the ways in which it will itself be read by academics and meta-
ﬁctionally steers the reader; a crypto-didactic function. First, it seems clear
that the novel ridicules purely aesthetic interpretations divorced from social
reality as affordable only to an a-political, privileged class group (the ‘Diony-
sian vision of ultimate carnival’). For a literary-critical reading of Bolaño’s
work to adopt this stance, therefore, would place its ﬁndings in logical contra-
diction with the text. Second, though, the text also pre-invalidates sociological
approaches of the academy towards the literature on the basis of the social
position that the university occupies; twinned with the police. To speak on
behalf of the subaltern through institutional practices that the text depicts
as married to violence suggests that literary criticism, in Bolaño’s take,
would do better to remain silent than to adopt a self-proﬁting strategy of
condescension.
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‘Strategies of condescension’, in the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, are ‘those
strategies by which agents who occupy a higher position in one of the hierar-
chies of objective space symbolically deny the social distance between them-
selves and others, a distance which does not thereby cease to exist’. From
such a situation, the dominant party in a power relationship ‘can use objective
distances in such a way as to cumulate the advantages of propinquity and the
advantages of distance, that is, distance and the recognition of distance war-
ranted by its symbolic denegation’.52 Bolaño demonstrates that his literary
critics are deploying such a strategy in their ‘defence’ of Liz Norton. At once,
most of the critics espouse feminist values (while not truly valuing Norton’s
intellectual contributions and instead wanting to sleep with her), while concur-
rently shunning notions of equality as it applies in other spheres of liberal tol-
erance. In this way, Bolaño makes his critics beneﬁt from an ethical payoff in
outwardly supporting feminist equality from their privileged position of patri-
archal authority while also showing that their underlying racism is intensely
problematic for any kind of inclusivity or intersectionality. In other words,
the beneﬁt to the critics themselves in outwardly collapsing the distance
between their patriarchal position and supporting Norton is transparent.
The same is true, however, of their critical reading practices. While beneﬁting
from a supposed history of liberal humanism and civic purpose, the critics
choose to explore aesthetics over ethics. Conversely, however, it is also true
that the rival critics, who do enact ethical readings, do so from a socially elev-
ated position, and so themselves beneﬁt from their critical, ethical reading.
This double-problem, in which criticism is scarcely possible, is reﬂected in
another didactic contradiction of the text: the temporal disjunction of its name.
As with most utopian ﬁctions that have to dislocate their settings, Bolaño cer-
tainly re-spatialises hiswork to aﬁctional SantaTeresa.However, the novel’s tem-
porality is debatably located amid a ﬂuctuation between the past, the
contemporary and the future. This is especially clear when the novel’s title is
read through the well-known reference in Bolaño’s previous novel, Amulet, to
a cemetery in the year 2666, a forgotten cemetery under the eyelid of a corpse or
an unborn child, bathed in the dispassionate ﬂuids of an eye that tried so hard
to forget one particular thing that it ended up forgetting everything else.53
Treating the title as a year, based on the Amulet reference, Henry Hitchens
pointed out that this could correspond to certain datings of the Exodus myth
occurring 2666 years after the creation, thus placing the novel’s key reference
point in our now-distant past.54 Conversely, as a year based on the Christian
calendar, the text implies a dystopian future; a direction in which humanity is
headed as the bodies of the present pile up and are forgotten. Amid these tem-
poral poles lies the novel’s present, which has to try not to ‘forget’ moral
lessons, learned either from the text’s future projection of a dystopian ceme-
tery or from its redemptive past reference point. In either case, the conception
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of time and forgetting is curious but can be linked back to a schooling purpose
within the novel.
Interestingly, what seems to emerge from this setup is that the issues of com-
mitment that 2666 frames do not appear to be concerned solely with artistic
practice; Bolaño does not seek to teach art how to represent. Instead, broadly
speaking, the text’s teachings are turned upon the academy. Bolaño’s novel,
in its treatment of the critics, seems designed to discipline, train and encourage
critics and the academy to write sociologically engaged criticism while concur-
rently negating the validity of those readings as strategies of condescension and
encouraging reﬂexive thought on the societal position of the university. That
thismetaﬁctional signalling is designed to teach and to alter critical subjectivity
is made clear through a conversation between two of Bolaño’s characters:
That’s a pretty story. [… ] A pity I’m too old and have seen toomuch to believe it
It has nothing to do with belief [… ] it has to do with understanding, and then
changing.55
This does, of course, have ironic consequences because, under such a mode,
Bolaño’s novel takes on utilitarian characteristics: it is itself as entangled in
the neo-liberal web of ‘use’ and ‘utility’ of art as the objects of its own critique.
In this environment, it might be concluded that Bolaño’s critique of the
university is one designed to shut down literary criticism. As either a hypocri-
tically positioned critical entity, or an ineffectually aesthetically obsessed
body, what hope does the university offer in a space where ‘the victims of
sex crimes in this city’ number ‘[m]ore that two thousand a year. And
almost half of them are underage. And probably at least that many don’t
report being attacked. [… ] every day more than ten women are raped
here’?56 Yet, as Catherine Belsey puts it: ‘[a]ssumptions about literature
involve assumptions about language and about meaning, and these in turn
involve assumptions about human society. The independent universe of lit-
erature and autonomy of criticism are false’.57 Bolaño also tells us, through
the previous Biblical reference in the novel’s title, that all is not lost; it is
not too late to begin a journey to a promised land and redemption might
still be possible. Although this doesn’t get us out of Adorno’s theoretical
problem that, in the false world all praxis is false, Roberto Bolaño espouses,
in 2666, an ethics that asks us to believe once more in the political, utopian
and didactic function of writing, both critical and creative. Critics must not,
though, be didactic. Bolaño makes it clear enough that this task is to be left
to ﬁction, for otherwise the critics become ‘like missionaries ready to instill
faith in God [… ] less interested in literature than in literary criticism, the
one ﬁeld, according to them – some of them, anyway – where revolution
was still possible’.58 Despite the criticism of the critics, however, Bolaño
also makes it clear that he does not want a vacuum: ‘[w]hat is it I want you
to do? asked the congresswoman. I want you to write about this, keep
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writing about this. [… ] I want you to strike hard, strike human ﬂesh, unas-
sailable ﬂesh, not shadows’.59 To keep writing amid the seeming impossibility
of writing seems to be the challenge that 2666 poses to the academy.
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